The Delhi High Court has ruled that a marriage claimed to be valid under Muslim personal law cannot provide immunity from criminal prosecution when the wife was below 18 at the time of sexual intercourse, reinforcing the protective framework of Secular POSCO. Justice Sanjeev Narula, while refusing to quash criminal proceedings against a 28-year-old man, held that personal law may determine the civil consequences of a marriage but cannot create an exception to criminal liability where Parliament has not provided one.
The case arose after a Muslim couple approached the High Court seeking quashing of an FIR registered against the husband under provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, commonly known as POCSO. According to the case record, the couple had married in December 2024, when the woman was approximately 16 years and three months old and the man was around 28.
The woman’s age came to light in 2026 when she visited a government hospital while approximately eight months pregnant. The hospital authorities informed the police after discovering that she was below the age of 18. The couple subsequently challenged the criminal proceedings, arguing that their marriage was valid under Muslim personal law and that the relationship had been voluntary. The case therefore raised a significant legal question concerning the interaction between personal law and Secular POSCO.
The petitioners relied on the argument that, under traditional interpretations of Muslim personal law, a Muslim girl who has attained puberty may have the capacity to enter into a marriage contract. They contended that if the marriage was legally recognised under the applicable personal law, sexual relations between the spouses could not subsequently be treated as criminal merely because the wife was below 18.
The High Court rejected that proposition as a basis for quashing the criminal case. The Bench drew a distinction between the civil status of a marriage and the criminal consequences of an act that is independently prohibited by statute. In doing so, the court emphasised that Secular POSCO establishes a statutory protection for children that cannot be displaced simply by invoking personal law.
The court also considered the question of consent. Under POCSO, a child is a person below 18 years of age, and the statute criminalises penetrative sexual assault against a child irrespective of consent. The BNS similarly establishes 18 as the relevant threshold in its provisions concerning sexual intercourse with a woman below that age. Section 63 of the BNS also limits the marital exception where the wife is under 18.
Justice Narula observed that marriage does not change a person’s age or confer legal capacity that the statute expressly withholds. In effect, the court reasoned that a girl who is 16 before a marriage ceremony remains 16 afterwards, and her age remains decisive when applying the statutory protections under POCSO and the BNS. This principle lies at the heart of Secular POSCO as described in the judgment.
The ruling also addressed the broader role of personal law. The court stated that personal law may determine whether a marriage has been contracted and the civil consequences flowing from it, but it cannot supply an exception to a criminal statute where Parliament has not created one. Allowing such an exception through judicial interpretation, the court noted, would effectively introduce a defence that the legislature had expressly withheld.
The judgment comes against the background of differing judicial approaches in earlier cases. A Delhi High Court bench in 2022 had taken a different position in a case concerning a Muslim marriage, while the Punjab and Haryana High Court also examined the capacity of a Muslim girl above 15 to enter into a marriage contract under Muslim personal law. Those decisions have contributed to continuing legal discussion over the relationship between personal law, child marriage and POCSO. The present ruling provides a distinct answer concerning criminal liability under statutory child-protection laws.
The court ultimately declined to quash the FIR and rejected the related requests for action against police officials and compensation. Its reasoning places statutory child protection at the centre of the criminal-law question, regardless of the claimed validity of the underlying marriage.
For Secular POSCO, the judgment is significant because it reinforces the proposition that the age-based protections created by Parliament cannot depend upon the religious or personal-law status of a relationship. The ruling does not decide every question concerning the civil validity of a Muslim marriage involving a minor; instead, it focuses on whether such a marriage can itself create immunity from prosecution under POCSO and the BNS.
The Delhi High Court’s decision therefore draws a firm legal distinction between recognising a relationship under personal law and determining whether conduct within that relationship attracts criminal liability under a secular statute. In the present case, the court concluded that Secular POSCO cannot be displaced by a claim of marital validity, while the statutory age of 18 remains central to the criminal-law analysis.
