The voteshare/seats conundrum: A case for Mixed-Member Proportional System?

The bizarre counting exercise for Bihar perpetuated by many media houses on the 8^th of November might have seen many twists and turns, but at the end of it all, it was conclusively proven that the NDA was no match for the might of the Mahagathbandhan. Nitish Kumar has become the Chief Minister for the fifth time, with a 26 year old RJD scion as his running mate. The results are quite interesting, as the CM is from a party which does not have the highest number of seats (that honor goes to the RJD), and is only third overall in terms of the vote share. The BJP with the largest vote share, is left with a measly 50 odd seats. This is the third, almost consecutive election in the past year and a half (LS-2014, Delhi, Bihar), where the vagaries of the first-past-the-post (FPP) system have resulted in near-brutal majorities for the leading parties, but has also pretty much decimated the opposition. Both of these are questionable developments in a modern democracy, and wouldn’t have come to pass if the election system were far more reflective of the people’s mandate. Indeed, the only major countries still using FPP are India, Canada, the UK, and USA, with most other functioning democracies using a more proportional system, or a form of run-off voting. The question of electoral reforms has rarely included discussions on the actual voting system itself, and as far as this author is concerned, is something that needs to be corrected.

The Indian requirements:

While the search for a new voting system might be construed as a considerable challenge; given the economic, social, and historical realities in India, one’s options are considerably reduced. For a new system to have any realistic chance of being accepted by the electorate, and to pass through parliament, it should try and fulfill, at the very least, the following three criteria:

1. It should not be too complicated for the voter, and should not alter the logistics of elections drastically.
2. It should not interfere with existing institutions, and must not alter the parliamentary nature of the Indian republic. Additionally, it should not rescind the idea of directly elected local representatives.
3. It should try and ensure maximum proportionality.

Any proportional system that involves ranking candidates, such as the single transferable vote, is automatically ruled out. These criteria also rules out other majority systems such as the alternative vote, and a two-round system, as they are not proportional, too complicated to implement, and hard to reconcile with the Westminster system. A purely proportional system, where one just votes for a party, and then the party decides to send representatives according to an internal list, is also not acceptable as the voters have no say in who exactly represents them in parliament. One is thus finally left with a mixed-member proportional system, such as one followed in Germany and New Zealand, which combines the best features of both systems, and tries to minimize the negatives of both.

Mixed-Member Proportional System explained:

On voting day, when the voter goes to the voting booth, he/she has to cast two votes, one for a candidate (as always), but an additional vote to a party. When the votes for the candidates are counted, the person with the most number of votes gets elected to parliament, as is the case now. The votes cast to the party are used to determine the final composition of the house, with a closed party list used to fill up the remaining seats in a proportional way. In cases where a party ends up with more directly elected candidates than its vote share (so-called overhang seats), the house is simply expanded, and other parties get more seats to achieve proportionality. At no point are the directly elected candidates forced to give up their seats. One could also impose an additional vote share criteria (5% being the norm) for parties to qualify for any additional seats over their directly elected representatives.

Bihar-a test case:

It is interesting to consider how the composition of the current Bihar assembly would be right now within an Mixed-Member Proportional System. At the start, let us assume that all parties have the exact same number of seats as they do now in this election. This is not particularly scientific, but will do for illustrative purposes. For simplicity’s sake, we show only the alliances, and not the individual parties in this example:

This table clearly illustrates the problem with the FPP system. The MGB has nearly 75% of the seats despite commanding only 41% of votes, while the non-MGB/non-NDA parties are an order of magnitude off from what they deserve. Interestingly, the NDA is relatively better represented, with the offset between seats and votes only about 8%.

Now, in a purely proportional system, the composition of the house would have been:

The MGB drops off seats considerably, while the non-MGB/non-BJP parties gain a substantial number of seats. While this might seem like a fractured mandate, politically speaking, the MGB is in a better position than the NDA to attract 19 more seats from the Others column. This system however does not take into account the 76 extra MLAs that the MGB won. Mixed-Member Proportional System accommodates these extra MLAs, and ensures proportionality at the same time. The house would therefore be:

Due to the substantial overhang in this election, the house expands from 243 seats to 423 in order to accommodate the extra directly-elected representatives of the MGB, and to ensure true proportionality. Though the MGB does not have a clear majority in this scenario, it is only 34 seats away from achieving one, and is the most realistic alliance that will form the Govt. in Bihar. In this example, the house seems to be quite bloated, which might raise some concerns about the system. This is largely due to our hypothetical assumption here that the alliances will retain all of their directly elected representatives as it stands in this particular election. In a true Mixed-Member Proportional System , this is unlikely to happen, and the overhang is typically of the order of 15-20 seats at the most. Moreover, we have not considered a minimum threshold for parties to return party-list seats to the assembly, which would once again reduce the number of seats than what is shown here.

A constant criticism of proportional systems is that they never ensure a majority for any party, and would always result in coalition governments. Leaving aside the question of propriety of having a Govt. that is supported by a minority of the electorate (as is normally the case in a multi-party polity), this is a genuine concern in India, and could be catastrophic for the passage of legislation, and for ensuring a stable Govt. for five years. One way of sorting this out in an Mixed-Member Proportional System, is to bring the under-represented parties to the numbers they would have had in the original composition of the house, but allow the overhang. To put it in numbers for this particular election:

In this hypothetical scenario, the house expands to 318 seats, with the MGB emerging as the clear winner, but with a reduced percentage of seats. True proportionality is not achieved, but a much better representation of the voters’ will is achieved here than in FPP, without sacrificing stability. In a wave election where the largest party has a substantial plurality, but not a majority (as was witnessed in Bihar, Delhi, and the LS polls), this version of the system will always ensure a clear winner, but will prevent brutal majorities, and a more empowered opposition than in FPP.

The political context of Mixed-Member Proportional System :

For Mixed-Member Proportional System to have a realistic chance of ever being adopted by parliament, it needs to be attractive to a majority of political parties. The party that would benefit the most from Mixed-Member Proportional System would be the BJP, which despite commanding up to 30% of the votes in its strong states, still ends up performing badly due to the vagaries of the FPP system. Indeed, the only time where the BJP benefited from FPP was in LS-2014, where despite winning only a plurality of the votes, ended up with a majority on its own due to the division of the anti-BJP votes, a blue-moon event that is unlikely to repeat itself in 2019, even if it ends up winning that election. The Congress is also sure to benefit from the Mixed-Member Proportional System , and return more seats than it has in recent times, thanks to a large number of loyal voters in most states. Regional parties such as the BSP which have done poorly in recent elections, despite commanding a committed chunk of voters, will also do much better in an Mixed-Member Proportional System. The only parties that might see their returns take a turn for the worse are those that have less than a 10% vote share, and depend on vote division to win a few seats in the assembly. At least to his author, there does not seem to be a major negative for most parties to shift towards Mixed-Member Proportional System , especially since nearly all of them have borne the brunt of being decimated in wave elections in the recent past, and this system would have brought their final tally to something more respectable than it stands now.

Considering the challenges involved in changing to a new voting system, Mixed-Member Proportional System would have to be introduced in a phased manner, ideally for local body elections first, followed by a few states, and then for parliamentary polls. This is a process that is sure to take a decade or two, but it will give the EC enough time to educate the electorate (and study any problems with the system), and for the average voter to adjust to the new system.

Whether the Mixed-Member Proportional System (or an alternative system) would come to pass is open to speculation. Nevertheless, it is important to start discussing this issue that few have addressed since the formation of the Indian Union, if one is to ensure a truly modern democracy for the 21^st century.