What unfolded in Bangladesh in 2024 was not a sudden democratic awakening. Nor was it an organic people’s revolt that spiralled out of control. It was a political unravelling that followed a familiar pattern—pressure from abroad, fractures within the state, street mobilisation driven by carefully chosen actors, and finally, a military that decided not to intervene.
Sheikh Hasina’s removal and Muhammad Yunus’s rapid elevation as Chief Adviser did not merely change governments in Dhaka. It altered the country’s strategic direction, reopened political space for Islamist actors long kept on the margins, and left Bangladesh more exposed to foreign influence than at any point since 1971.
Former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal has since claimed that the sequence bore the hallmarks of a pre-planned operation, describing it as a “perfect CIA plot,” with Pakistan’s ISI acting as a silent partner. At the centre of his allegation lies the role of Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman, accused of withholding military support at the decisive moment.
Whether every element of this claim can be independently verified is beside the larger point. The outcome speaks for itself.
How a Protest Became a Collapse
The initial spark was unremarkable. In early July 2024, students protested recruitment quotas that favoured families of 1971 freedom fighters. The policy had long been criticised as a mechanism that benefited Awami League loyalists, and resentment had been building quietly for years. What changed was the speed and scale of escalation.
Within days, demonstrations spread across major campuses. By mid-July, confrontations turned violent. Police stations were attacked. Party offices were torched. Over 300 people were killed in clashes that bore little resemblance to spontaneous protest. Internet shutdowns followed. The government’s heavy-handed response only widened the rupture.
Behind the scenes, something more consequential was unfolding. As unrest peaked in early August, General Waker-Uz-Zaman reportedly held meetings with opposition figures and student organisers—contacts that would later be cited by Hasina loyalists as evidence of betrayal. On August 5, Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled the country. The army announced the transition on television. No election was announced. No constitutional roadmap was offered.
Within seventy-two hours, Muhammad Yunus returned to Dhaka and was sworn in. That speed mattered.
Washington’s Long Friction With Hasina
The breakdown between Washington and Sheikh Hasina did not originate in 2024. It had been building steadily. US sanctions on Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion in 2021 marked the first rupture. Visa bans imposed in 2023 deepened it. When the Awami League won the January 2024 election amid an opposition boycott, the US publicly dismissed the result as lacking credibility.
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By mid-2024, the dispute had become openly strategic. Hasina accused Western powers of seeking access to St. Martin’s Island, a small but strategically significant landmass in the Bay of Bengal.
She rejected any foreign military presence outright. Her remarks about a “white-skinned power” seeking to undermine Bangladesh’s sovereignty were unusually direct. Weeks later, she was gone. Washington’s response to her ouster was swift. Statements welcoming the interim government followed. Diplomatic engagement resumed. Aid flows reopened. The contrast was not subtle.
The Return of Islamist Street Power
One of the clearest consequences of Hasina’s fall was the sudden rehabilitation of Jamaat-e-Islami. During the July–August unrest, Jamaat cadres and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, were repeatedly visible at the centre of violent confrontations. Their mobilisation appeared organised, disciplined, and well-resourced. Hasina banned Jamaat on August 1 under anti-terror laws. Less than a month later, the Yunus administration reversed that decision.
The symbolism was unmistakable. Jamaat’s leadership re-entered mainstream politics almost overnight. Its historical role during 1971 was pushed aside. Its street machinery was back in play. For a country founded on secular nationalism, the shift was profound.
Pakistan’s Quiet Leverage
Parallel to these developments ran Pakistan’s long game. Reports circulating in Dhaka suggest that several student organisers had travelled outside Bangladesh as early as 2023, including visits to Pakistan and Gulf transit hubs. These meetings allegedly involved ISI intermediaries and focused on expanding agitation beyond quota reform.
By the time unrest peaked in 2024, coordination between Jamaat networks, BNP figures abroad, and digital propaganda channels was already in place. After Hasina’s flight, the pattern became clearer. “India Out” slogans replaced governance demands. Hindu neighbourhoods were attacked. Temples were vandalised. The unrest acquired a communal dimension that served no domestic reform agenda—but aligned neatly with Islamabad’s regional objectives.
Why India Was Made the Target
India’s decision to shelter Sheikh Hasina provided a convenient narrative pivot. Rather than confronting the constitutional vacuum left behind, the interim leadership and aligned groups redirected public anger outward. Floods were blamed on India. Economic distress was framed as foreign sabotage. Even internal violence was attributed to imaginary conspiracies.
The objective was not persuasion. It was distraction. By externalising blame, those who benefited from the transition avoided scrutiny. It also helped revive long-standing narratives that suit both Islamist mobilisation and Pakistan’s strategic messaging.
What Lies Ahead
Bangladesh now faces a precarious future. Investor confidence is fragile. The garment sector, already under pressure, is vulnerable to prolonged instability. Minority communities face renewed insecurity. Islamist actors, once marginalised, now shape street power. Above all, sovereignty is thinning. A weak, divided Bangladesh is easier to influence. It is more responsive to external pressure. It is less capable of independent strategic choice.
What replaced Sheikh Hasina was not a strengthened democracy. It was a managed transition that left the state weaker, the political field narrower, and the country more exposed than before. History will judge the outcome not by slogans raised in 2024, but by what Bangladesh loses in the years that follow.
