In contrast to the conflicting signals from Nepal last week, another neighbour, Bhutan has keept ties with India alive and warm.
Following up on Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay’s official visit to New Delhi this March, Bhutanese King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck came to Delhi in the first week of December exploring a deeper relationship.
Unlike Nepalese Prime Minister KPS Oli who chose to break tradition of making New Delhi his first official port of call and instead went to China, Bhutan’s Tobgay came to New Delhi, reposing faith in the special relationship between both countries and the tradition of regular high-level exchanges between them.
Bhutan and India share a common foreign policy vis-à-vis assertive China, in contrast to the vacillating Nepal.
The flurry of bilateral visits also includes the prominent official tour of Bhutan by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the heels of Tobgay’s visit to India.
Both sides officially state that India-Bhutan relations are the epitome of a win-win relationship between two neighbours who vastly differ in size.
In this backdrop, Prime Minister Modi offered to strengthen the partnership and reiterated India’s strong commitment to the economic development in Bhutan, highlighting the doubling of India’s development support to Bhutan for its 13th five-year plan period.
Apart from exchanging thoughts on bilateral cooperation in diverse areas, including clean energy, trade and investment, space and technology, the two leaders exchanged ideas on the ‘Gelephu Mindfulness City’ initiative, a visionary project spearheaded by Wangchuk to catalyse Bhutan’s development and strengthen linkages with adjoining border areas in India.
A renewed dose of friendship with India comes at the right time for Bhutan which, like the former, is facing an increasingly assertive China.
According to reports, China disputes Bhutan in the north and the west sectors. In the north, Pasamlung and Jakarlung are disputed, and in the west, the disputed regions are Dramana and Shakhatoe, Sinchulungpa and the Langmarpo valleys, Yak chu and Charithang valleys, and the Doklam region.
Both sides have held innumerable rounds of talks since 1984. A media report says: “In the mid-90s, Bhutan rejected China’s proposal to give up on the western disputed territories, especially the Doklam trijunction, fearing that it would have security repercussions for India. Despite the ongoing negotiations, China has continued building roads and settlements and populating some disputed territories.”
Bhutan’s fears came true when a Chinese attempt to alter the status quo in 2017 led to the Doklam standoff between India and China. In 2020, China laid fresh claims to the east of Bhutan in Sakteng, presumably emanating from its claims over India’s Arunachal Pradesh.
With increasing pressure, says a media report, “the previous administration signed a three-step road map, held four expert group meetings, the 25th round of negotiations, and signed a cooperation agreement with China—aiming to demarcate all of its disputed borders except for the Doklam region, which will be resolved trilaterally—between India, China, and Bhutan”.
Amid such complications, Bhutan’s Tobgay came to India, primarily to request India to assist with Rs 100 billion for the 13th five-year plan (FYP) and an additional Rs 15 billion for the economic stimulus package. India, noticing how Tobgay chose New Delhi as the first stop for his visit, responded positively.
China and Bhutan watchers say that while Bhutan and India deepen common understanding on economic and geopolitical issues, China will not keep quiet and try to influence the agenda in the region to target Indian interests.
It will have to be seen how long China will hold the Sakteng dispute over Bhutan in order to keep the latter under stress. It would also want the Bhutanese economy to weaken in order to buy its way into a relationship with Bhutan in exchange for loans with questionable clauses.
As it is, bilateral trade has gone up between them since they decided to establish diplomatic relations.
On its part, India has conveyed to Bhutan that as a good friend it will sand by its all-weather friend and neighbour. After all, Bhutan has never played the China card with India unlike other neighbours including Nepal.
In addition to delaying a trilateral solution for Doklam, China’s baseless claims over Arunachal Pradesh will further sharpen its rhetoric and claim over Bhutan’s Sakteng. This assertiveness will subject Bhutan and its border negotiation tactics to more strain. Besides, a weak Bhutanese economy will also be prone to more Chinese economic influence and inroads. For instance, Bhutan’s trade with China has skyrocketed from a mere `2 billion in 2020 to `15 billion in 2022 alone. This trade might even increase further as China and Bhutan have expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations. On its part, New Delhi knows that it will have to tread these Himalayan roads with caution. For now, its message is clear and resolute—it will stand by its all-time friend and neighbour in its hour of need.
As things stand today, the India-Bhutan ties may reach a testing point soon. China is trying its best to convince the small country to befriend the Chinese economic model to prosper economically. That model is based on signing agreements with China as part of the controversial BRI scheme. Bhutan is anyway well aware of the negative impact of BRI on other countries in the region, especially Sri Lanka. But it is time India takes into account China’s attempts and makes its own economic model more flexible to benefit itself and Bhutan.
