Pakistan’s military leadership has repeatedly stated that the country has moved beyond direct political intervention. Officially, elections, courts, and civilian institutions are presented as the drivers of political outcomes.
Yet developments surrounding Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) indicate that older methods of political control have not disappeared, they have evolved. Rather than overt takeovers or blanket bans, Pakistan’s power structure increasingly relies on managed outcomes—reshaping political forces without formally dissolving them.
This approach is not new. It was applied most visibly in Karachi against the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and now appears to be unfolding again, this time on a nationwide scale. Understanding this pattern is essential for anyone assessing Pakistan’s political stability and democratic trajectory.
Managing Political Forces Without Outlawing Them
MQM was once the dominant political force in urban Sindh, particularly Karachi. Its decline did not occur through a decisive electoral defeat or a formal prohibition. Instead, it was gradually weakened through pressure on leadership, selective enforcement of law, encouragement of internal splits, and recognition of alternative factions deemed more acceptable.
The precedent was set during Operation Clean-up in June 1992. Security operations targeted MQM’s organisational structure and leadership networks, while splinter groups that distanced themselves from confrontational politics were allowed to function. Contemporary human-rights reporting noted a clear disparity in treatment, raising concerns about selective application of state power.
This strategy was refined over time. In August 2016, following controversial remarks by MQM founder Altaf Hussain, media access was abruptly curtailed, legal pressure intensified, and a new party structure emerged with institutional backing. MQM remained present in name, but its political independence was effectively neutralised.
No formal admission of intelligence involvement was ever made. Nor was one required. In Pakistan, political management is rarely articulated openly. Its existence is inferred from consistent patterns and outcomes.
PTI and Expansion of the Model
The same approach appears to be unfolding against PTI, but on a much broader scale.
Following the removal of Imran Khan from office and his subsequent imprisonment, PTI has faced widespread arrests, prolonged legal proceedings, restrictions on media visibility, and sustained pressure on elected representatives to defect. While these actions are officially attributed to civilian institutions, their coordination and political selectivity suggest an organised effort rather than isolated enforcement.
The military trial of former ISI chief Lt Gen Faiz Hamid has further reinforced perceptions of a deliberate political recalibration. For many observers, it signals an attempt to dismantle PTI’s former power alignments while facilitating the emergence of leadership figures seen as less confrontational.
Internal differentiation within PTI has become increasingly pronounced. Leaders advocating accommodation with the current power structure continue to operate in public political space. By contrast, figures—particularly at the grassroots level in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—who call for sustained resistance face greater constraints.
The implicit message is consistent with past precedent: political participation remains possible, but only within limits set outside the electoral arena.
Implications for Stability and Governance
Supporters of Pakistan’s security establishment argue that PTI’s political strategy created instability that required firm corrective action. Similar arguments were made in earlier decades to justify interventions against MQM. Those measures did not produce long-term stability. Instead, they entrenched institutional distrust, weakened civilian governance, and contributed to prolonged political volatility.
From an international perspective, the concern is not the fate of a single party, but the durability of Pakistan’s political system. A state in which popular political movements can be restructured through coercive pressure rather than electoral competition faces persistent legitimacy challenges.
Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed country with a population exceeding 240 million amplifies these risks. Systems that rely on political management rather than consent may appear stable in the short term, but they tend to be brittle under stress.
Karachi’s experience offers a cautionary example. The nationalisation of this model raises questions about Pakistan’s long-term democratic resilience.
Until the military and intelligence apparatus withdraw from civilian political arbitration in practice—not merely in official statements—the pattern is likely to repeat. MQM was an early case. PTI is a contemporary one. Others may follow.
For external partners, this cycle complicates engagement with Pakistan’s democratic institutions and raises enduring concerns about governance, accountability, and political inclusion.
