The Collegium system, which governs the appointment and transfer of judges in India, has been a subject of extensive debate and criticism since years. Introduced through judicial interpretation rather than constitutional mandate, the system has led to concerns about transparency, accountability, and nepotism in judicial appointments. While the independence of the judiciary is paramount, the unchecked power of the Collegium has resulted in an opaque and self-perpetuating system that lacks democratic oversight.
The Collegium system was established through a series of Supreme Court rulings rather than by constitutional design. The First Judges Case (1981) upheld executive primacy in judicial appointments. However, the Second Judges Case (1993) overturned this and established that the Chief Justice of India (CJI) must have primacy in judicial appointments. The Third Judges Case (1998) further refined this, mandating a Collegium comprising the CJI and four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court to select judges. This shift in power effectively removed the executive from the process, making the judiciary self-appointing. While this system was introduced to safeguard judicial independence, it has instead led to an insular system where judges appoint their successors without external checks. This goes against the original intent of the Constitution, as seen in Article 124, which explicitly states that judges should be appointed by the President in consultation with the judiciary, not by the judiciary alone.
One of the most significant criticisms of the Collegium system is its opacity. Judicial appointments are made behind closed doors, with no recorded reasons for selection or rejection of candidates. The process lacks objective criteria, making it susceptible to favoritism and personal biases. There have been instances where competent judges and lawyers have been overlooked due to a lack of personal connections within the judiciary. Moreover, there is no formal mechanism to challenge Collegium decisions. Unlike other democratic institutions where checks and balances exist, the judiciary in India has given itself absolute authority in appointing judges. This goes against the principles of accountability that are fundamental to democratic governance.
The lack of transparency has also led to concerns about nepotism within the judiciary. Reports indicate that a significant percentage of judges in higher courts are related to former judges or senior lawyers. This has led to the perception that the Collegium system favors those with connections over those with merit. In a country with a vast pool of legal talent, it is problematic that judicial appointments are often influenced by personal relationships rather than objective assessment. Former Supreme Court judge, Justice J. Chelameswar, has been vocal about the flaws in the Collegium system, describing it as “a system where only judges appoint judges with no input from the executive or the public.” He has also pointed out that discussions within the Collegium are not formally documented, leading to a lack of accountability.
While the Collegium system was introduced to prevent undue executive influence in judicial appointments, it has instead created a judiciary that is accountable only to itself. A democracy functions best when power is distributed among various institutions, ensuring that no single entity has unchecked authority. In countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, judicial appointments involve a more balanced process, often with input from both the executive and independent commissions. The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was an attempt to reform the Collegium system by involving the executive, judiciary, and independent members in judicial appointments. However, the NJAC was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 for violating judicial independence. Critics argue that the judiciary acted in self-interest, rejecting a reform that would have introduced much-needed transparency.
The flaws of the Collegium system make it imperative to introduce a more transparent and accountable method of appointing judges. Several reforms can be considered. Establishing a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) comprising representatives from the judiciary, executive, and independent legal experts can ensure a fair and balanced process. Such a system exists in the UK and has proven effective in maintaining judicial independence while ensuring accountability. The Collegium’s deliberations and reasons for appointing or rejecting candidates should be documented and made publicly available. This will reduce the scope for arbitrary decisions and enhance public confidence in the judiciary. A structured and objective framework should be established to evaluate candidates based on legal expertise, integrity, and past judgments rather than personal connections. While judicial independence must be preserved, some level of legislative oversight can ensure that appointments are made in a fair and transparent manner. This can be done by having a parliamentary committee review appointments without giving it veto power. Regular performance assessments for judges can ensure accountability. While judges enjoy security of tenure, a mechanism to review their judgments and conduct can help maintain judicial integrity.
The Collegium system, in its current form, is undemocratic, opaque, and in need of urgent reform. While judicial independence is critical, absolute power without accountability is detrimental to democracy. A balanced approach that ensures both judicial autonomy and institutional accountability must be adopted. The establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission with transparent selection criteria and documented deliberations is a necessary step toward restoring faith in the judiciary.
