Romesh Thappar: The case that defines the flexibility of the Constitution

According to Thapar, the section was void according to Article 13(1) of the Constitution.

The Indian Constitution is often cited as a rare combination of flexibility and rigidity. The Constitution makers took into account fears from the past as well as needs for the future. Initially, it seemed impossible to see how the balance would play out. All it needed was one case to kick off the proceedings.

Government curbs press freedom 

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, an English journal named Cross Roads became famous for its unequivocal criticism of government. Fearing the discontent within itself, the governor of Madras banned the entry and circulation of The Journal in Madras.

To validate the ban, the governor used his powers under Section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. Under this section, the Governor could ban the circulation of literature that he or she thinks is dangerous to public safety and the maintenance of public order.

When editor Romesh Thappar received the order, he approached the Supreme Court. In his petition, Romesh Thappar argued that it was a direct and unconstitutional attack on his freedom of speech. He also questioned the constitutional validity of Section 9 (1-A) of the act.

According to Romesh Thappar, the section was void according to Article 13(1) of the Constitution. The article establishes the Constitution as the funnel through which the purity of colonial-era laws would be tested.

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Government tried to invalidate the petition

In its counter, the government attacked Romesh Thappar for directly approaching the Supreme Court. Madras government relied on Article 226; Section 435 of CrPC; and Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. To buttress its point, the government cited the rules of practise established in the Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha case and the American cases of Urquhart v. Brown and Hooney v. Kolohan.

Putting an end to these elaborative contentions, the Apex Court ruled that the protection of fundamental rights supersedes anything else. It said that the remedy for an invasion of fundamental rights is itself a fundamental right. Article 32, which provides for citizens to directly approach the SC in such cases, was cited by the Court as vindication of its argument.

Source: Indiankanoon

Government’s intent was doubtful

Then the Court checked the merits of the case. It went into the history and purposes behind the act to check whether it was in accordance with the Constitution or not. The act stood the test of Section 100 of the Government of India Act 1935, read with Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act. These provisions empowered the government to curb free speech on the basis of apprehension of harming public order.

But the aforementioned section did not use this phrase and instead used “public safety and public order.” The Madras government argued that the expressions “public safety” and “public order” are used to denote the security of the state. Since the security of the state is a constitutionally valid justification for curbing free speech, the government urged that the ban be justified. 

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The line between public disorder and the security of the state 

However, the court did not agree with it. The Apex Court held that public safety and public order are largely different from the security of the state. Using IPC sections 279 and 289 as examples, the court stated that even trivial acts such as rash driving constitute a threat to public order. On the other hand, “security of state” is a more dangerous and broad term, validated by stringent sections such as 121 and 124A of the IPC. 

Source: Indiankanoon

At the same time, the Apex Court identified that a few acts against public order may be aimed at harming the security of the state. But then again, it refused to give constitutional validity to public orders.

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Possibly, because putting it in the constitutional framework would result in suppressive governments using it as an excuse to curb dissent. The SC then abridged the government, saying that it is a constitutional obligation on legitimate authorities to differentiate between local acts of public disorder and those threatening the security of the state.

Source: Indiankanoon

The Act in question was found to be violative of freedom of speech, as “public order” was not a criteria for curbing free speech.

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The judgement ended up coercing the Nehru government to amend the Constitution. In the 1st constitutional amendment, Nehru blurred the line between acts of public disorder and acts harming the security of the state.

In later years, courts had to resort to liberal interpretation to preserve the intent of the original Constitution’s makers. The fight is still going on and will keep going, thanks to the flexibility of our setup.

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