Each December, memories of the 2001 Parliament attack return with a familiar weight. The assault was foiled by brave security personnel.
Still, it also revealed something deeper about the security environment India inhabits, the presence of a state-enabled militant ecosystem across the western border, one that has endured for decades despite international scrutiny and domestic instability within Pakistan.
At the centre of this ecosystem stands Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)—a group that has adapted, regenerated and continued to operate despite bans, sanctions and repeated diplomatic pressure.
Understanding why JeM has lasted as long as it has requires confronting a blunt reality: its survival is not accidental. It is tied to Pakistan’s long-standing reliance on proxy groups as tools of influence.
Strategy Rooted in Pakistan’s Civil–Military Structure
Proxy warfare is often portrayed as a tactical convenience. In Pakistan’s case, it has been closer to a structural choice, shaped by the military’s dominant political role and its perception of threats. For decades, Pakistan’s Army has viewed non-state actors as assets that offset conventional asymmetry with India, offering deniability while advancing strategic aims.
JeM emerged within this space. Though formally banned in 2002, the group’s leadership continued to operate out of Bahawalpur, and its networks remained largely intact. Multiple governments in Islamabad declared restrictions, yet JeM’s infrastructure—its madrassas, training circuits and mobilisation drives—continued to function.
This is not because the state lacks the capacity to dismantle such groups; rather, it reflects how deeply these organisations are woven into Pakistan’s internal power dynamics. So long as the military establishment sees value in certain proxies, formal bans do little more than create an administrative façade.
International Pressure Has Not Altered the Core Logic
Pakistan’s extended tenure on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list should have been a turning point. The global body had highlighted deficiencies in terror-financing controls, and JeM was repeatedly referenced in international discussions.
Yet, while Pakistan did make technical adjustments, the fundamental environment in which JeM operates did not change. Its leadership remained within Pakistan, its facilities remained identifiable, and its ideological apparatus continued uninterrupted.
The international community has, on occasion, misread Pakistan’s tactical compliance as strategic reorientation. In reality, the deeper civil–military equation—where militant groups serve as instruments of leverage—has remained largely intact.
Internal Instability Increases the Incentive to Use Proxies
Pakistan faces political turbulence and economic strain today. Historically, such periods have strengthened the military’s hand. They also increase the temptation to lean on low-cost instruments that offer strategic signalling without inviting full-scale war. Proxy groups fit that requirement.
For India, this means that moments of internal Pakistani crisis are not moments of reduced threat. They may, in fact, signal the opposite. When a state is under pressure, it may rely even more heavily on familiar tools—especially those that provide deniability.
JeM’s continued activity, including recent linkages uncovered in Delhi and elsewhere, fits this pattern. The group is not operating independently of the state’s internal constraints; it is responding to them.
India’s Challenge: Preparing for a Moving Target
India’s counter-terror capabilities have expanded significantly since 2001. Intelligence sharing through the Multi-Agency Centre is more structured. Investigations are more coordinated. The National Investigation Agency brings dedicated focus to complex, transnational cases. States have improved their own preparedness.
But the challenge posed by Pakistan’s proxy strategy is not simply operational; it is conceptual. Groups like JeM evolve in response to pressure. They shift from fidayeen units to distributed cells.
They recruit educated individuals. They move seamlessly between physical and digital spaces. They establish initiatives like Jamaat-e-Mominaat, which broadens the pool of ideological supporters. The difficulty lies in confronting an adversary that does not remain still.
A Stable Doctrine on the Other Side, Need for Clarity on Ours
Pakistan’s proxy doctrine has survived changes in government, shifts in geopolitical alignments and international censure. Its consistency stems from the institutional dominance of the military, which has long viewed proxies as instruments that expand strategic bandwidth without requiring decisive confrontation.
For India, the response must be equally stable. It requires sustained investment in intelligence, financial tracking, border management and cyber capabilities. It demands diplomatic engagement that keeps international focus on Pakistan’s obligations under UN frameworks.
And above all, it requires public clarity that the problem is not episodic, but structural. This is why anniversaries matter—not for ceremony, but for strategic recall.
The Real Lesson of 13 December
The Parliament attack remains instructive not because of what happened on that morning, but because of what enabled it. JeM could attempt an assault on India’s democratic core because it operated within a protected space across the border. That space still exists. The names of commanders may change; the methods may evolve; but the doctrine that sustains them has been remarkably consistent.
India’s task is to maintain a preparedness posture that reflects this reality. Proxy warfare thrives when its targets grow complacent. It falters when the intended victim recognises the strategy and invests accordingly.
Two decades on, the responsibility is clear. The threat persists because the strategy that produced it persists. Our response must be rooted in the same clarity—and the same continuity.
Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.
