The Fourth Frontier: Space Weaponization and Global Security Challenges

Weaponisation of Space

Weaponisation of Space (AI generated Image)

Earlier this year, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) rejected the draft resolution that was jointly introduced by the United States and Japan on a weapon-free outer space. The resolution received a vote of 13 (in favour) to 1 (against), with one abstention, being China. Russia vetoed the draft resolution that would have confirmed that nations that ratified the 1967 Outer Space Treaty are required to uphold their commitments to refrain from placing “any objects” containing weapons of mass destructions (WWD) in orbit around the planet or installing them on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space.

Any other weapons in space were not included in the vetoed resolution, it only focused on nuclear weapons and other WWDs. The resolution would have had the members states of the organ with major space capabilities, to actively contribute to the objective of peaceful use of outer space and prevent arms race in outer space, thereby restraining actions that would be contrary to maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation.

This brings to mind the question, what do we mean by weaponisation of space or space weaponisation? The term refers to the process of deploying weapons in space, which may subsequently turn space into a battlefield. Such weapons would be designed to destroy targets in orbit or on the surface of the Earth. Conversely, militarisation of outer space means the use of space to support military operations on land, at sea, and in the air. While space weaponisation turns outer space into the battlefield, militarization of space aids armies on the conventional battlefield.

Space is the “fourth frontier of war.” Weaponisation of space is driven by the desire to gain military superiority on all fronts of conflicts, or lack of faith on the ability of current missile defence military to prevent an intercontinental ballistic missile or to protect space assets from incoming anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). The deployment of orbital or suborbital satellites to target enemy satellites, the firing of space jets with ground-based direct ascent missiles, the jamming of signals from enemy satellites, etc. are all examples of space weaponisation.

Treaties and Proposals

Some of the treaties and proposals that aimed to regulate space weaponisation, are: The Outer Space Treaty that was signed in 1967 as a result of United Nations efforts to establish an agreement to regulate activity in space starting in 1966. As nuclear and other WMDs were the most dangerous during the Cold War era when the treaty was drafted, only these weapons were prohibited from space. Liability was not explicitly stated in this treaty, which only covered weapons that were “placed in orbit” or on a celestial body. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects is a pertinent treaty that addresses liability for damages caused in space.

The Chinese and Russian Proposal, China and Russia jointly presented a draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to the UN Conference on Disarmament in February 2008. This proposal offered definitions of prohibited weapons and made an effort to define and forbid the proliferation of weapons in space.

A UN resolution called the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) calls for a prohibition on the weaponisation of space. It was first put forth by an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament in the 1980s. The United States is the only nation to oppose the proposal, which has been reintroduced in recent years and is up for vote every year.

European Union Policy Proposal was a voluntary set of guidelines pertaining to issues like space debris and the use of satellites or craft in space was proposed by the European Union in 2008. The majority of major space nations, including China, Russia, India, and the United States, rejected it. All three of these proposals have been rejected in one way or another by the international community. The unknowns of space and nations’ desire to avoid unduly restricting their future access, particularly in light of developing technologies and defensive requirements, are thought to be the main sources of concern.

The Dual use Conundrum

The weaponisation of space pose a challenge of differentiating between space technologies that are used for military and civilian purposes. Numerous space systems, including satellites, launch vehicles, and communication networks, can be modified for military uses like targeting, surveillance, or reconnaissance in addition to being used for peaceful purposes like weather forecasting or communication. For instance, GPS, which was first created for military applications, is now widely used for civilian ones but is still essential to military operations. Likewise, adversary satellites can be rendered inoperable or destroyed by anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, which are intended to safeguard space assets.

This overlap complicates international regulations and agreements, such as the Outer Space Treaty, which restricts the militarization of space but leaves room for ambiguity in how technologies are applied. An arms race in space could result from countries developing defensive technologies that can also be used offensively, which poses security risks. Space-based missile defense systems could be used as platforms for offensive military operations in addition to providing protection against threats like asteroids. Keeping space a peaceful area in the face of escalating geopolitical tensions is challenging due to the dual-use nature of space systems.

In coming future, one might expect a new era of rapid and intense space weaponisation, similar to the expansion of air weaponisation in the early 20th century, given the growth of space weaponisation and its ongoing trajectory under the current technological, geopolitical, and legal situation. States can more easily handle intentional geopolitical choices as they negotiate space-related strategic and security conditions, even though it is impractical to obstruct space-related technological advancement and limit other states’ weapons development.

The rapid development of air weaponisation before and during World War I served political purposes, but it did not cause the break out of war. World War I was a result of unstable politics, destabilizing events, miscalculations, and security dilemmas, all compounded by deliberate geopolitical choices leading up to active hostilities that locked states in an inevitable crisis. The international community must therefore concentrate on taking intentional geopolitical measures to prevent conflict escalation into space, even in the face of a period of rapid and intense space weaponisation.

 

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